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Introduction  
 
Medicine is a moral enterprise, and young people who enter 
professional school are presumed to be morally astute, as well as 
intellectually capable.  Thoughtful students quickly grasp the fact that what 
we can do in medicine usually outpaces the consensus of what we ought to 
do, and one of the earliest questions these students ask is how they should go 
about honoring their individual consciences in the face of patients, peers or 
teachers who profess divergent values, or request services that jar the young 
professional’s sense of ought-ness.  Medical educators readily acknowledge 
the need, indeed the moral requirement, to teach ethics, but struggle to 
ascertain the most effective, efficient and compelling way to present the 
material and engage the moral reasoning of students who are already 
inundated with basic and advanced science studies (Self & Baldwin, 1994).  
Students appreciate hearing about case stories, but do not want much in the 
way of philosophical theory.  Most students at our institution have 
backgrounds in biology or chemistry; few have taken any courses in 
literature, philosophy, religion, ethics or other humanities.  The handful of 
lectures and small-group case-based discussions related to ethical dilemmas 
in medicine offered in the curriculum are helpful, but often fail to prepare 
the young physician adequately for a life in which moral questions daily will 
present themselves. 
We are piloting an approach to moral teaching in medicine based on 
an examination of conscience formation and functioning, and the 
understanding of the intersection of personal conscience with professional 
medical and ethical values.  We believe that conscience theory and language 
may be a useful addition to the traditional approaches to dilemma resolution 
that involve principles, theories, and case based reasoning.  In this paper we 
will explore traditional ethical resolution methods, give a brief history and 
overview of Conscience Theory, and then show through case example how 
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using Conscience Theory may allow a richer examination of the most 
poignant and troubling dilemmas physicians face. 
 
  
Case Illustration  
 
For several years in an introduction to medicine course, the following 
clinical/ethical scenario was one of several used to stimulate discussion 
about dilemma resolution possibilities.  Respondents were asked to describe 
the dilemma and their approach to it, using whatever methods seem most 
appropriate, and to defend their proposed resolution (The Patient-Doctor 
Relationship, course syllabus, 1993). 
 
A 26 year old man with Crohns disease presents to the emergency department with 
toxic megacolon and a lower GI bleed.  His hemoglobin is 6.4, white cell count is 
16.7.  He is alert, oriented and appears competent.  Despite resuscitative procedures, 
he continues to bleed.  Emergent total colectomy is scheduled.  However, the young 
man states that he is a Jehovah's Witness, and that he will not accept blood 
transfusions under any circumstances.  His wife and family (parents) reinforce his 
decision.  The anesthesiologist is torn, but states she will not transfuse the patient 
during surgery, even if it results in his death.  The senior surgeon states that he has 
an obligation to do everything he can for the patient, and that it would be wrong to 
stand by and let a man under his care die unnecessarily.  The surgeon will not 
operate under these conditions.  The patient will likely die without both surgery and 
transfusions.  
 
 
Traditional approaches 
 
There are several respected and effective 
approaches to ethical decision making in 
medicine.  One can utilize major moral 
principles of autonomy (respect for 
persons), beneficence (do good, promote 
good or prevent evil), non-maleficence 
(refrain from doing harm), and justice 
(consideration of fair distribution of 
burdens and benefits, or consideration of 
what is due or owed others) (Pellegrino, 
1993).   
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Another approach is to apply one or more ethical theories to a moral 
problem in medicine.  Three major theories readily apply:  consequentialism, 
deontology, and virtue-based ethics (for readily manageable reviews of each 
see: A Companion to Ethics, 1993). 
 
 Consequentialism, 
also referred to as 
teleology, 
utilitarianism, or 
ends-based reasoning, 
would resolve the 
dilemma through 
consideration of what 
would bring about the 
greatest good for the 
greatest numbers.  
Unflattering 
commercial 
description and 
language related to 
this theory include 
"the ends justify the 
means," and "bottom-
line considerations." 
 
 
 
 
Deontology, also 
known as rule-based 
reasoning, on the 
other hand, 
approaches an ethical 
dilemma by asking, 
"What is the highest 
principle (rule) that 
should be followed?", 
or  "What is the one 
principle that should 
never be violated?" 
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Virtue theory 
is first concerned with 
the moral actor rather 
than the choice of 
action and asks the 
question, 
 "What would a good 
physician (teacher, 
parent, lawyer etc) do in 
this circumstance?" 
(Closely related to 
virtue theory is the 
'care-based' approach 
which considers what 
the decision-maker 
would want done 
himself/herself in a 
similar circumstance). 
 
  Each of the aforementioned approaches, used singly have contributory 
value but also limitations. Each is important but not sufficient.  
An integrated approach to 
dilemma resolution, involving care-
based and duty-based ethics as well 
as greatest good inquiries, has been 
described by Rushworth Kidder in 
his book How Good People Make 
Tough Choices.  During many 
years as a columnist for the 
Christian Science Monitor, Kidder 
collected human interest stories and 
was fascinated by the range of 
difficult, poignant and sometimes 
tragic decisions ordinary people 
encountered every day. Despite 
diverse situations, professions, or 
perspectives, though, the moral 
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choices tended to fall into one (or more) of four dilemma paradigms, also 
referred to as 'right vs. right' dilemmas :  truth 
vs. loyalty; justice vs. mercy; individual vs. 
community; and, short term vs. long term.  
None of these pairs contains an obvious easy 
moral choice, and indeed, under most 
circumstances a moral person would affirm 
the goodness of being both truthful and loyal, 
merciful and just, concerned with individuals 
and also communities, and respecting both 
short and long term goals.  But Kidder's point 
is that there are moments of moral choice in 
which it is not possible to do both (e.g., be 
merciful and just), one has to act, and often 
there is not much time to analyze options 
(Kidder, 1995).  
As a practical matter, conscientious people use some or all of these 
principles and theories every day, choosing the approach that best fits the 
situation at hand.  Formally, the 'best fit' method is called casuistry. 
Casuistry describes the process of analyzing a moral dilemma or case by 
comparing it to other well-known and ethically scrutinized scenarios.  The 
consideration is whether the present case is more like case A which we know 
about, or case B, also well discussed and about which moral consensus has 
emerged. These paradigm cases serve as ethical guideposts in a sense, and  
resolution of a new case may proceed along the lines of reasoning employed 
in earlier situations ( for comprehensive reviews of casuistical traditions, 
see: Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988; Kirk, 1999). 
 
 
 
Limitations of traditional approaches 
 
In the medical arena, respect for a patient's free choice necessarily 
invokes the principle of autonomy, and a physician's professional duty to 
treat his/her patient with the best medical therapy available reflects 
beneficence.  Sometimes, though, a  physician's relationship with a patient 
might also require a choice between professional duty and respect for the 
person's wishes:  the moral question of how to negotiate a competent 
patient's DNR (do not resuscitate) directives when that patient undergoes an 
operation is an example, not far removed from the case that was introduced 
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earlier. Does a DNR necessarily restrict a surgeon and/or anesthesiologist in 
the care they provide during the perioperative period? Are 'routine' operating 
room procedures considered 'resuscitative' measures at any other time or 
place?  Reverting to principles does not help here, as both autonomy and 
beneficence/non-maleficence are prima facie duties, morally obligated under 
ordinary circumstances; and, neither ethical theory or principlism suggest an 
easy way of resolving conflicting autonomous claims of patient and 
physician.  
Another example involves the moral question of physician-assisted 
suicide which, at least on one level, seeks to balance an autonomous person's 
request for relief of suffering with professional obligations to do no harm, to 
preserve life. Put in more personal language, this dilemma asks what is the 
morally right and good response of a virtuous physician in the face of her 
patient's terrible suffering? Again, an appeal to principles will be insufficient 
to resolve the competing claims of autonomy and beneficence.  
Consequentialism's 'the ends justify the means' may be attractive, but 
deontology would counter that killing is wrong. There are no paradigm cases 
yet, although a few scenarios have been debated publicly and even presented 
to the U.S. Supreme Court. Kidder's framework suggests that mercy requires 
physician compliance with the request, but the long term consequences of 
this action, particularly if codified, are unpredictable and possibly 
unacceptable.  
 
Language 
 
Medical language has aspired to be a language of science, facts, 
objectivity, and so-called 'value neutrality'. The acquisition of medical 
language requires years of rigorous scientific study and dedication to minute, 
non-subjective data. The relentless pursuit of objective observation, itself 
driven by specifiable values, may nonetheless silence the larger language of 
values. Moral imagination, essential for ethical dilemma solving in the 
clinical setting, becomes hard to retrieve and activate. Moral language is the 
language of values, virtues, choice.  At some point, moral language becomes 
personal: 'I choose to do this because of the values I hold, in accordance 
with the image I have of myself as a good person'.  Physicians, confronted 
with a moral choice, sometimes seem unable to describe adequately what is 
happening both externally (that which could be considered 'objective' and 
verifiable) and internally. Application of principles or theory  to a medical 
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ethical dilemma may be appropriate but insufficient, leading to an 
unsatisfactory 'resolution' for all parties involved. 
In the case of  the Jehovah Witness, most medical students and 
teaching colleagues framed the dilemma as a conflict between the informed 
patient's right to choose and the physicians' obligations to provide effective 
and compassionate medical care. In short, the case discussions became very 
brief indeed, with a cursory discussion of patient autonomy and physician 
beneficence, and an occasional appeal to a judge to decide if treatment could 
be ordered. Students complained the case was too easy; everyone knew the 
patient had a right to decide against treatment so what was the problem? 
 
Conscience Theory 
 
If limiting medical-ethical deliberations to principles and 
theories sometimes leaves physicians, patients and families with 
unresolved concerns, it may be helpful to enlarge the scope of the 
deliberation to acknowledge the fuller context of the patient's life 
through considerations of connectedness, emotional harmony, and 
values.  Conscience language and theory may act as a bridge here, 
linking traditional ethical theory, principles, dilemma resolution 
processes, and the profession and practice of medicine.  A theory of 
conscience formation and functioning was initially developed to 
account for empirical findings from a study of the moral 
developmental psychology of children and adolescents, begun in the 
early 1980’s. The principal instrument used was the Stilwell 
Conscience Interview (SCI) to engage the child in her awareness of 
aspects of her moral identity. After completing initial work on normal 
development of conscience (Stilwell & Galvin, 1985, Stilwell, Galvin, 
Kopta, 1991, Stilwell, Galvin, Kopta, and Norton, 1994, Stilwell, 
Galvin, Kopta and Padgett, 1996, Stilwell, Galvin, Kopta, Padgett and 
Holt, 1997, Stilwell, Galvin, Kopta and Padgett, 1998) the 
investigators began to describe conscience development and 
functioning in abused and neglected children (Galvin, Stilwell, 
Shekhar, Kopta, and McKasson, 1997; Galvin, Stilwell, Adinamis and 
Kohn, 2001), and collaborated on an international project examining 
the effect of a natural catastrophe, the devastating 1988 earthquake in 
Armenia, on the conscience functioning of young adolescents 
(Goenjian, Stilwell, Steinberg, Fairbanks, Galvin, Karayan, Pynoos, 
1999). Initial investigations highlighted the normal developmental 
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stages of conceptualization of conscience from something posited by 
the preschool child in the locus of external authority to something 
internalized, personified, and eventually integrated into the 
personality as a moral organizer by the older adolescent (Stilwell, et 
al, 1985; 1991). In addition to the developmental stages, five 
domains of conscience, including conceptualization, have been 
described.  In the conceptualization domain, a person provides the 
basic definition of what governs his or her moral life. The person’s 
consciousness of how he or she is composed as a moral being is 
elicited in a deliberate effort that allows for the emergence of a 
personal definition, distinct from his or her generalized application of 
the term, ‘conscience.’  Conceptualization anchors the developmental 
features of four other domains.  In turn, any of the four other domains 
may be salient in current conscience functioning and formation, 
thereby imparting distinctive character to the overall conscience 
concept. The resultant variety found among persons in their contours 
of conscience is not susceptible of staging.  The other four domains 
are: moral emotional responsiveness, moral valuation, moralized 
attachment and moral volition.  
In the domain of moral emotional responsiveness transitions 
occur in the ways emotions are perceived as regulating moral behavior 
in response to an “am good-feel good” set point on a personal moral 
emotional barometer. Moral emotional responsiveness ties morality to 
physiology. Deviations from the ‘am good-feel good” set point create 
uncomfortable feelings that motivate prosocial behavior, inhibit 
harmful behavior and motivate the processes of reparation and healing 
after wrongdoing (Stilwell et al, 1994). Discrete emotions theory (e.g. 
Izard, 1977), the concept that each human has an affective core under 
the control of the biologic processes of self-regulation, preadaptation 
for participation in human interactions and affective monitoring 
(Emde, 1983), aspects of temperament theory (e.g. Kagan, 1989; 
Kochanska, 1991;1993) and concepts of stress (Chrousos and Gold, 
1992) contributed to the construct of this domain.   
In the domain of moral valuation transitions occur in the 
process of defining, prioritizing, and justifying moral rules on behalf 
of values. The moral rules are categorized within a triune relational 
context, referred to as the valuation triangle: rules that sustain respect 
for authority; rules that sustain self-respect, uphold self-development, 
and preparation for future responsibility; and rules that sustain respect 
for and promote responsibility among equals. Both moral reasoning 
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and psychological defenses operate in the domain of moral valuation. 
Transitions in processing moral dilemmas correlate with 
conceptualization stages (Stilwell, et al, 1996).  
Moralization of attachment is the domain that holds processes 
and activities of the other domains within the bonds of human 
relationship: viz, internalization of another’s moral presence in one’s 
own conscience concept, one’s moral emotional experience of others 
via empathic and sympathetic arousal, creation of rules that value 
others’ needs, establishment of relationship hierarchies and fairness 
among equals and, in the domain of moral volition, the transformation 
of agency into advocacy for others (Stilwell, et al, 1997).  Attachment 
theory (e.g. Bowlby, 1988) and the developmental stage theory of 
empathy (e.g. Hoffman, 1991) contributed to the construct of this 
domain. 
Moral volition is the domain in which autonomy and will are 
coordinated with the felt obligation to restrain or take action. 
Autonomy is the recognition of the self as independent; will is the 
way in which an independent person intentionally chooses and directs 
his or her behavior. In this domain two processes are involved: self-
evaluation in the light of external and internal standards reflecting 
moral values and conscious choosing to refrain from antisocial 
behavior and to engage in prosocial behavior (Stilwell et al, 1997).  
 
The third aspect of 
conscience theory is the idea that for 
each domain of conscience there 
corresponds an intrinsic (bedrock) 
value that may be seen as exerting 
both a developmental push and an 
ethical pull on the person of 
conscience.  These bedrock values, 
respective to the above-mentioned 
domains, are: moral meaning 
making (composing a good life), 
connected-ness, balance or 
harmony, worthiness (with respect 
to authority, self and others) and 
freedom. 
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Conscience Sensitive Medical Education  
 
While research on conscience formation and functioning in children 
and adolescents was being conducted, the authors also continued to teach 
students and residents in the medical school. Daily, conversations with the 
learners at all levels reflected moral concerns explicitly and implicitly.  It 
was not surprising, for instance, that students complained about time 
pressures, worried about intimate relationships surviving medical school, 
struggled with insufficient knowledge to help suffering patients, and debated 
the proper 'role' of a junior clerk on a team.  Residents struggled with the 
same issues, as well as the increased burden of primary responsibility of 
caring for medically complex patients in acute and long-term care settings 
while chronically sleep-deprived, teaching younger residents and students, 
and attempting to understand the bewildering rules of the "business of 
medicine" prior to leaving residency and getting a 'real job.'  These concerns, 
as well as others, were well-known to the authors through painful personal 
and professional experience, and prompted some new considerations. 
Initially in 1998, at the request of the I.U. Director of Residency Training in 
Psychiatry, a new course in ethics was developed for third year psychiatry 
residents. The course continues to be offered each year (Galvin, Gaffney, 
Stilwell, Abram, 1997). Subsequently an adaptation of the SCI, The Indiana 
University Conscience Autobiography for Healthcare Professionals 
(I.U.CAP; Galvin, 1998, see appendix) has been used with first year medical 
students to help  learners employ 'conscience' questions to a medical ethical 
scenario.    
Specifically, in a small group of first year medical students we 
conduct a demonstration conscience interview with a volunteer student. The 
interviewee is invited to respond freely at whatever level of disclosure is 
comfortable. The observing learners are invited to respond privately.  After 
the interview is completed, the preceptor helps the group members identify 
their peer's domains of conscience through answers given to certain 
questions in the interview. Later sessions further explore specific domains, 
using question sets from the I.U. CAP pertinent to each domain. 
 
           Learning Activities According to Domains of Conscience 
 
Moral Imagination or conceptualization of conscience: I.U. CAP questions 
1,2 & 11.  We ask all students to engage in definition and then in narrative 
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imagery or drawing to conceptualize their conscience.  Group discussion 
ensues.  
Moral Attachment: I.U. CAP questions 6 through 10.  An additional 
heuristic device is the  "triple-pass genogram".  We ask the students to 
prepare a genogram, and the first time through we look for the standard 
biological relationships.  The second examination explores the emotional 
connections, and finally, we ask the students to identify who cares most 
about their moral lives and/or who are their most important moral 
exemplars.  The triple pass genogram is helpful to the learner in describing 
the transmission of values across generations. 
Moral Emotional Responsiveness: identification of moralized emotions, 
reparation, and healing.  I.U. CAP questions 3 & 4 (we dub these our "rings 
of Glaucon questions") and question 5.  In our experience, first year students 
discuss the possibility of 'harming' a patient more readily than do third year 
students or residents.  One specific activity exercising the moral imagination 
is to construct a letter of apology to a patient harmed.  We discuss the 
required elements in such a letter and what each party may expect to 'get out' 
of it.  Discussion of forgiveness often ensues. 
Moral Valuation: I.U. CAP questions 12 through 14.  We use the image of a 
"valuation triangle" showing developmental shifts among authority- 
attributed, peer-attributed and self-attributed values.  We also use the 
heuristic device of applying grids to rules in order to elicit values and to 
discern the 'best value'-'strongest motive' gap for both abiding by and 
rejecting the rule.  Here students may explicitly refer to both externally 
derived rules and norms, including legal implications of activities or 
decisions, as well as their own internal moral motivations and references.  
Moral Volition: I.U. CAP question 15.  Inquiries are first directed to 
successful experiences in making caring efforts contrary to an inclination not 
to.  Discussion of interferences in conscience functioning ensues.   
 
 
 An Application to the Case Illustration 
 
We will now return to the case illustration regarding the young man 
committed to the principles of the Jehovah Witness faith.   
We decided to apply conscience language to the case to see if the resulting 
discussion could uncover any other layers of considerations.  We asked the 
students to consider three of the major moral participants, the patient, the 
anesthesiologist and the surgeon, as persons of conscience, and imagine the 
dilemma from each of their perspectives.  Starting with the patient, 
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autonomous choosing (moral volition) applies, and specifies that the patient 
wants surgery but not transfusion.  With respect to moral attachment and the 
intrinsic value of connectedness, it would be important to explore the 
patient's web of relations with family, friends, and co-workers, while 
respecting the patient's autonomous choices.  What will this decision mean 
to each of those morally relevant persons?  What may be the effects of his 
choice on his wife, parents, other members of his religious community, and 
on the physicians caring for him?  The truth of his connectedness locates 
him within many communities bound to be affected by his choice.  The 
values of the religious teachings are powerful external motivators, but what 
of his personal sense of the worth of his life?  Perhaps the two are 
inextricably bound, but one does not know this unless questions about the 
relationship between physical and spiritual survival values are explored.  
How does the patient's attachment to the physician figure in?  Hard for the 
physician to ask but perhaps contributing to a struggle with conscience is the 
question how does the patient react in terms of moral emotional responses to 
putting his physicians in a moral dilemma?  The patient could be asked: 
How would you respond in terms of moral emotions if you were transfused 
against your will?   
 
The anesthesiologist, bound by professional values and the principle 
of beneficence, nevertheless believes that the patient's choice takes moral 
precedence over other considerations.  A particularly important question for 
this person of conscience is: How will you respond if the patient dies and 
your transfusion could have prevented the death?  And how do you react to 
being put in this position of choice? 
 
The surgeon took the same oaths as did the anesthesiologist, but holds 
a different understanding of medical and moral duty.  Perhaps he is 
connected more tightly to medical principles and his community of medical 
peers, and values the patient's (physical) survival over the patient's religious 
beliefs and related right to refuse treatment.  The surgeon believes that to 
allow a preventable death is NOT a choice for him.  Perhaps the most 
poignant questions to put to this physician are:  How will you be affected if 
you refuse to operate, thus ensuring beyond doubt the patient's death?  Or, 
how will you react if you operate and transfuse the patient who survives, but 
accuses you of desecrating him and condemning him to eternal damnation?  
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Moral valuation involves the intrinsic value of the worth or worthiness 
of the triune considerations of authority, peer and self.  Both patient and 
physician seek, make, and keep values, and hold respect for self and others. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Ethical principles and theory may not be sufficient to resolve the most 
challenging and  messiest moral dilemmas in medicine;  the moral domains 
of human conscience may provide the missing links to achieving satisfying 
resolution of the most poignant moments of ethical conflict. Exploring these 
additional aspects of a seemingly "easy" ethics scenario leads to a richer 
understanding of the humans involved and their struggles to respect 
themselves and others as persons of conscience.  The outcome of this case, 
i.e. the "answer," may be the same:  autonomy trumps beneficence, but the 
deeper understandings gained through an exploration of conscience may 
have profound consequences on the moral survivors of such a difficult 
human intersection. 
  
Limitations. Conscience theory will not resolve easily the dilemmas 
inherent in issues as thorny as, 
for example,  physician assisted 
suicide, but arguably enlarges 
and enriches the attendant 
dialogue and debate. Dying 
persons, no matter how 
independently and 
autonomously they have lived, 
rarely die entirely alone, and 
conscientious physicians rarely 
abandon suffering patients to 
professional mandates. Thus, 
the dilemma is incompletely 
framed as a conflict between 
autonomy and beneficence.  
Other values of  love, loyalty, 
connectedness and harmony are 
morally relevant for both the 
patient and her physician.  
Commitment to advancing 
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knowledge and improving the care of dying persons compel the physician to 
further efforts at truly caring for the patient.  Both partners, patient and 
physician, struggle to reconcile the competing rules and values that govern 
them, and strive to understand the meaning of their lives. 
 
 
Future Research and Ethical Inquiry.  What we have piloted in the 
educational arena raises questions susceptible of empirical research and/or 
ethical inquiry. First, how does conscience intersect with traditional medical 
ethical decision-making? Related questions are: What can an understanding 
of moral stakeholders as persons of conscience do to inform ethical decision-
making? How would this understanding contribute to clinical ethics 
consultations and deliberations on clinical ethics committees? Second, what 
happens to a person of conscience when (s)he undergoes the rigorous 
process of professional education? Related questions are: Does a prospective 
physician's conscience have a particular contour, identifiable as such? What 
effect does general medical training  have on a person's conscience, and is 
the effect similar from one person to another? Are persons with certain 
contours of conscience more apt to choose certain specialties? Is there an 
identifiable moratorium in conscience formation in medical school? If so, is 
it an essential part of the professional developmental process or is it contrary 
to optimal professional development in the form of developmental delay? 
Put another way, when the challenges of  medical school cease to be 
experienced as opportunities for moral growth and, instead, emerge as 
adverse life events more akin to maltreatment or an earthquake, what are the 
demoralizing effects on, the psychopathological interference with, persons 
becoming professionals of conscience? Can these effects and interferences 
be counteracted? Can they be anticipated and prevented?  
 
Concluding Comments. The questions above are posed but not answered. 
We believe that a young person of conscience who enters professional 
school experiences a molding or contouring of his/her personal conscience.  
As other decision-making processes become "professionalized," that is 
informed and shaped by professional values and norms, so also does the 
individual conscience.  But in our experience of teaching medical ethics we 
have found that a focus on ethical theory or principle does not completely 
satisfy the students' moral inquiry.  Positioned as they are between their 
former non-initiated selves and the new life they are in the process of 
obtaining, our youngest students most clearly articulate the moral question 
as:  What am I to do in this situation? With this question they put their own 
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moral selves squarely in the dilemma, and ask for guidance to negotiate 
between personal and professional values.  Conscience sensitive medical 
education is a valuable tool in this process, allowing exploration of personal 
values and modeling respect for different values of peers, teachers and 
patients.  
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